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The Secretary Returns
Shai Vardi ∗
Abstract
In the online random-arrival model, an algorithm receives a sequence of n requests that arrive
in a random order. The algorithm is expected to make an irrevocable decision with regard to each
request based only on the observed history. We consider the following natural extension of this
model: each request arrives k times, and the arrival order is a random permutation of the kn arrivals;
the algorithm is expected to make a decision regarding each request only upon its last arrival. We
focus primarily on the case when k = 2, which can also be interpreted as each request arriving at,
and departing from the system, at a random time.
We examine the secretary problem: the problem of selecting the best secretary when the secre-
taries are presented online according to a random permutation. We show that when each secretary
arrives twice, we can achieve a competitive ratio of ∼ 0.768 (compared to 1/e in the classical sec-
retary problem), and that it is optimal. We also show that without any knowledge about the number
of secretaries or their arrival times, we can still hire the best secretary with probability at least 2/3,
in contrast to the impossibility of achieving a constant success probability in the classical setting.
We extend our results to the matroid secretary problem, introduced by Babaioff et al. [BIK07],
and show a simple algorithm that achieves a 2-approximation to the maximal weighted basis in the
new model (for k = 2). We show that this approximation factor can be improved in special cases of
the matroid secretary problem; in particular, we give a 16/9-competitive algorithm for the returning
edge-weighted bipartite matching problem.
1 Introduction
The secretary problem [Lin61, Dyn63] is the following: n random items are presented to an observer in
random order, with each of the n! permutations being equally likely. There is complete preference order
over the items, which the observer is able to query, for the items he1 has seen so far. As each item is
presented, the observer must either accept it, at which point the process ends, or reject it, and then it is
lost forever. The goal of the observer is to maximize the probability that he chooses the “best” item (i.e.,
the one ranked first in the preference order). This problem models many scenarios; one such scenario is
the one for which the problem is named: n secretaries arrive one at a time, and an irrevocable decision
whether to accept or reject each secretary is made upon arrival. Another is the house-selling problem,
in which buyers arrive and bid for the house, and the seller would like to accept the highest offer. An
alternative way of modeling this problem is the following. Each secretary is allocated, independently
and uniformly at random, a real number r ∈ [0, 1], which represents his arrival time. As before, the
seller sees the secretaries in the order of arrival and must make an irrevocable decision before seeing
the next secretary. It is easy to see that the two models are essentially equivalent (assuming n is known,
see e.g., [Bru84]) - the arrival times define a permutation over the secretaries, with each permutation
being equally likely. The optimal solution for the classical secretary problem is well known - wait until
approximately n/e secretaries have passed2 (alternatively until time t = 1/e), and thereafter, accept a
∗Blavatnik School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University. E-mail: shaivar1@post.tau.ac.il. This research
was supported in part by the Google Europe Fellowship in Game Theory.
1We use male pronouns throughout this paper for simplicity. No assumption on the genders of actual agents is intended.
2The exact number for each n can be computed by dynamic programming, see e.g., [GM66].
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secretary if and only if he is the best out of all secretaries observed so far (e.g., [GM66, Bru84]). This
gives a probability of success of at least 1/e.
Consider the following generalization of the secretary problem: Assume that each secretary arrives k
times, and the seller has to make a decision upon each secretary’s last arrival. We model this as follows:
Allocate each secretary k numbers, independently and uniformly at random from [0, 1), which represent
his k arrival times. (Equivalently, we may consider only the order of arrivals; in this case each of the
(kn)! permutations over the arrival events is equally likely.) A decision whether to accept or reject a
secretary must be made between his first and last arrival. We call this problem the (k − 1)-returning
secretary problem. The secretary problem is a classical example of the random-arrival online model
(e.g., [BMM12, MY11]), and our model immediately applies to this more general framework, capturing
several natural variations thereof, for example:
1. Requests may not require (or expect) an immediate answer and will therefore visit the system
several times to query it.
2. When requests arrive, the system gives them either a rejection or an acceptance, or an invitation
to return at some later time. It turns out that in many cases, very few requests actually need to
return; in the secretary problem, for example, a straightforward analysis shows that the optimal
algorithm will only ask O(log n) secretaries to return.3
3. Requests may enter the system and leave at some later time. The time the request stays in the
system can vary from “until just before the next item arrives”, in which case no information is
gained, to “until the end”, in which case the problem reduces to an offline one. Clearly we would
like something in between. When k = 2, the second random variable allocated to the query can
be interpreted as the time that the query leaves the system, giving a natural formulation of this
property in the spirit of the random-arrival online model.
1.1 Our Results
When each secretary returns once (i.e., k = 2), we show that the optimal solution has a similar flavor to
that of the classical secretary problem - wait until some fraction of the secretaries have passed (ignoring
how many times each secretary has arrived), and thereafter hire the best secretary (out of those we have
seen so far), upon his second arrival. To tightly bound the probability of success (for large n), we
examine the case when each of the 2n arrival times is selected uniformly at random from [0, 1). We use
this model to show that the success probability tends to 0.76797 as n grows. In the classical secretary
problem, it is essential to know the number of secretaries arriving in order to achieve a constant success
probability. We consider the case when n is not known in advance (and there is no extra knowledge,
such as arrival time distribution), and show that by choosing the best secretary we have seen once he
returns, with no waiting period, we can still obtain a success probability of at least 2/3. We also consider
cases when k > 2: we show that for k = 3, we can achieve a success probability of at least 0.9, even
without knowledge of n, and show that setting k = Θ(log n) guarantees success with arbitrarily high
probability (1− 1
nα
for any α).
We extend our results to the matroid secretary problem, introduced by Babaioff et al., [BIK07],
which is an adaptation of the classical secretary problem to the domain of weighted matroids. A weighted
matroid is a pairM = (E,I) of elements E and independent sets I , and a weight function w : E → R,
which obeys the properties of heredity and exchange (see Section 2 for a formal definition). In the
matroid secretary problem, the elements of a weighted matroid are presented in random order to the
online algorithm. The algorithm maintains a set S of selected elements; when an element e arrives,
3The algorithm will only ask the ith secretary that arrives to return if he is the best out of all the secretaries it has seen thus
far. The probability of this is 1/i. Summing over all secretaries gives the bound.
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the algorithm must decide whether to add it to S, under the restriction that S ∪ {e} is an independent
set of the matroid. The algorithm’s goal is to maximize the sum of the weights of the items in S. It
is currently unknown whether there exists an algorithm that can find a set whose expected weight is a
constant fraction of the optimal offline solution. The best result to date is an O(
√
log ρ)-competitive
algorithm,4 where ρ is the rank of the matroid, due to Chakraborty and Lachish [CL12]. We show that in
the returning online model, there is an algorithm which is 2-competitive in expectation (independent of
the rank). We also show that for bipartite edge-weighted matching, and hence for transversal matroids5
in general, this result can be improved, and show a 16/9-competitive algorithm.
1.2 Related Work
The origin of the secretary problem is still being debated: the problem first appeared in print in 1960
[Gar60]; its solution is often credited to Lindley [Lin61] or Dynkin [Dyn63]. Hundreds of papers have
been published on the secretary problem and variations thereof; for a review, see [Fre83]; for a historical
discussion, see [Fer89]. Kleinberg [Kle05] introduced a version of the secretary problem in which we
are allowed to choose k elements, with the goal of maximizing their sum. He gave a 1 − O(√1/k)-
competitive algorithm, and showed that this setting applies to strategy-proof online auction mechanisms.
The matroid secretary problem was introduced by Babaioff et al., [BIK07]. They gave a log ρ-
competitive algorithm for general matroids, where ρ is the rank of the matroid, and several constant-
competitive algorithms for special cases of the matroid secretary problem. Chakraborty and Lachish
[CL12] gave an O(√log ρ) algorithm for the matroid secretary problem. There have been several im-
provements on special cases since then. Babaioff et al., [BDG+09] gave algorithms for the discounted
and weighted secretary problems; Korula and Pál [KP09] showed that graphic matroids6 admit 2e-
competitive algorithms; Kesselheim et al., [KRTV13] gave a 1/e-competitive algorithm for the secre-
tary problem on transversal matroids and showed that this is optimal. Soto [Sot13] gave a 2e2/(e − 1)-
competitive algorithm when the adversary can choose the set of weights of the elements, but the weights
are assigned at random to the elements, (and the elements are presented in a random order). Gharan and
Vondrák [GV13] showed that once the weights are random, the ordering can be made adversarial, and
that this setting still admits O(1)-competitive algorithms. There have been other interesting results in
this field; for a recent survey, see [Din13].
1.3 Comparison with Related Models
There are several other ther papers which consider online models with arrival and departure times. Due
to the surge in interest in algorithmic game theory over the past 15 years, and the economic implications
of the topic, it is unsurprising that many of these papers are economically motivated. Hajiaghayi et al.,
[HKP04], consider the case of an auction in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and the buyers arrive
and depart dynamically. They notice and make use of the connection to the secretary problem to design
strategy-proof mechanisms: they design an e-competititive (w.r.t. efficiency) strategy-proof mechanism
for the case k = 1, which corresponds to the secretary problem, and extend the results to obtain O(1)-
cometitive mechanisms for k > 1. Hajiaghayi et al., [HKMP05], design strategy-proof mechanisms for
online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wire-
less network access, and each agent is assumed to arrive and depart dynamically. Blum et al., [BSZ06],
consider online auctions, in which a single commodity is bought by multiple buyers and sellers whose
bids arrive and expire at different times. They present an O(log (pmax − pmin))-competitive algorithm
4An online algorithm whose output is within a factor c of the optimal offline output is said to be c-competitive; see Section 4
for a formal definition.
5Transversal matroids (see Section 5 for a definition) are a special case of bipartite edge-weighted matching.
6In a graphic matroid G = (V,E), the elements are the edges of the graph G and a set is independent if it does not contain
a cycle.
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for maximizing profit and an O(log(pmax/pmin))-competitive algorithm for maximizing volume where
the bids are in the range [pmin, pmax], and a strategy-proof algorithm for maximizing social welfare.
They also show that their algorithms achieve almost optimal competitive ratios. Bredin and Parkes
[BP12] consider online double auctions, which are matching problems with incentives, where agents
arrive and depart dynamically. They show how to design strategy-proof mechanisms for this setting.
1.4 Paper Organization
In Section 2 we introduce our model. In Section 3 we provide an optimal algorithm for the returning
secretary problem. In Section 4 we give a 2-competitive algorithm for the returning matroid secretary
problem, and in Section 5, we show we can improve this competitive ratio to 16/9 for transversal
matroids (and more generally, returning edge-weighted bipartite matching). In Appendices A and B,
we analyze the cases of the k-returning secretary problem for k = 3 and k = Θ(log n).
2 Model and Preliminaries
Consider the following scenario. There are n items which arrive in an online fashion, and each item
arrives k times. Each arrival of an item is called a round; there are kn rounds. The order of arrivals is
selected uniformly at random from the (kn)! possible permutations. An algorithm observes the items as
they arrive, and must make an irrevocable decision about each item upon the item’s last appearance. We
call such an algorithm a (k−1)-returning online algorithm and the problem it solves a (k−1)-returning
online problem. Because the problem is most natural when k = 2, for the rest of the paper, (up to and
including Appendix 5), we assume that k = 2 (and instead of “1-returning”, we simply say “returning”.)
In Appendices A and B we consider scenarios when k > 2.
We use the following definition of matroids:
Definition 2.1. A matroid M = (E,I) is an ordered pair, where E is a finite set of elements (called the
ground set), and I is a family of subsets of E, (called the independent sets), which satisfies the following
properties:
1. ∅ ∈ I ,
2. If X ∈ I and Y ⊆ X then Y ∈ I ,
3. If X,Y ∈ I and |Y | < |X| then there is an element e ∈ X such that Y ∪ {e} ∈ I .
Property (2) is called the hereditary property. Property (3) is called the exchange property. An in-
dependent set that becomes dependent upon adding any element of E is called a basis for the matroid.
In a weighted matroid, each element e ∈ E is associated with a weight w(e). The returning matroid
secretary problem is the following: Each element of a weighted matroid M = (E,I) arrives twice, in
an order selected uniformly at random out of the (2n)! possible permutations of arrivals. The algorithm
maintains a set of selected elements, S, and may add any element to S at any time between (and includ-
ing) the first and second appearances of the element, as long as S ∪ {e} ∈ I . The goal of the algorithm
is to maximize the sum of the weights of the elements in S. The success of the algorithm is defined by
its competitive ratio.
Definition 2.2 (competitive ratio, c-competitive algorithm). If the weight of a maximal-weight basis of a
matroid is at most c times the expected weight of the set selected by an algorithm (where the expectation
is over the arrival order), the algorithm is said to be c-competitive, and its competitive ratio is said to
be c.
A special case of the returning matroid secretary problem is the returning secretary problem, in
which there are n secretaries, each of whom arrives twice. The goal of the algorithm is to identify the
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best secretary. The algorithm is successful if and only if it chooses the best secretary, and we quantify
how “good” the algorithm is by its success probability.
Without loss of generality, we assume throughout this paper that the weights of all the elements are
distinct.7 Although we do not discuss computational efficiency in this work, all the algorithms in this
paper are polynomial in the succinct representation of the matroid.
We denote the set {1, 2, . . . n} by [n].
3 The Returning Secretary
Assume that there are n secretaries that arrive in an online fashion. Each secretary arrives twice, and
the order is selected uniformly at random from the (2n)! possible orders. At all times, we keep note of
who the best secretary is out of all the secretaries seen so far. We call this secretary the candidate. That
is, in each round, if the secretary that arrived is better than all other secretaries that arrived before this
round, he becomes the candidate. Note that it is possible that in a given round, the candidate will have
already arrived twice. At any point between each secretary’s first and second arrival, we can accept or
reject him; an acceptance is final, a rejection is only final if made upon the second arrival. Once we
accept a secretary, the process ends. We win if we accept (or choose) the best secretary. We would like
to maximize the probability of winning.
3.1 Optimal Family of Rules
What is the best strategy for maximizing the probability of winning? We first show that the optimal rule
must be taken from the family of stopping rules as described in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. The optimal strategy for choosing the best secretary in the returning secretary problem
has the following structure: wait until d distinct secretaries have arrived; thereafter, accept the best
secretary out of the secretaries seen so far, when he returns.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to strategies that make decisions regarding
a secretary s only upon s’s arrivals, as every strategy that makes decisions between the two arrival times
has an equivalent strategy that defers the decision making to the second arrival. Let dr be the random
variable denoting the number of distinct secretaries that have arrived up to (and including) round r
(r ∈ [2n]). Denote by H(r) = {x1, x2, . . . , xr−1} the history at round r, where xi = (yi, zi): yi is the
relative rank (among the secretaries that have arrived until now) of the secretary that arrived at time i,
and zi represents whether this is the first or second time that this secretary has arrived (i.e. yi ∈ [dr],
zi ∈ {1, 2}). Any (deterministic) strategy S must have the following structure: for every realization of
xr = (yr, zr), and H(r), S must accept or reject. That is S : (Hr, yr, zr) → {accept, reject}. Denote
the optimal strategy by S∗. Clearly,
1. If the tth secretary is not the best, we will not choose him: ∀yr 6= 1, S∗(Hr, yr, zr) = reject.
2. If this is the first time we have seen a secretary, we cannot gain anything by choosing him now. It
is better to wait for the second arrival, as we lose nothing by waiting: S∗(Hr, yr, 1) = reject.
Therefore, we only need to consider choosing the best secretary we have seen so far when he returns;
i.e., we only accept at time t such that yr = 1, zr = 2. For all other values of yi and zi, S∗ must reject;
henceforth, we only focus on the case that yr = 1, zr = 2, and omit this from the notation. Denote the
event that S∗ accepts on history Hr by Acc(Hr). As S∗ is a probability-maximizing strategy,
S∗(Hr) = accept ⇐⇒ Pr[win |Acc(Hr)] ≥ Pr[win |¬Acc(Hr)]. (1)
7Babaioff et al., [BIK07] show that we do not lose generality by this assumption in the matroid secretary problem. The
result immediately applies to our model.
5
Given that dr = d, Pr[win |Acc(Hr)] = d/n, as this is exactly the probability that the best secretary
is part of a group of d secretaries selected uniformly at random. Although we cannot give such an elegant
formula for Pr[win |¬Acc(Hr)], we know that it is the probability of winning given that we have seen d
secretaries, rejected them all, and have (n − d) secretaries remaining to observe; hence, the probability
is dependent only on d (as n is fixed). Denote this probability function by f(d). We do not attempt to
describe f , other than to say that f must be non-increasing in d. (This is easy to see: f(d) ≥ f(d + 1)
as a possible strategy is to always reject the dth secretary.)
As the left side of (1) is an increasing function of d, and the right side is a decreasing function of d
(and as S∗ is a probability-maximizing function), S∗ will accept only if the number of distinct secretaries
that have arrived is at least d∗, the minimal d such that d/n ≥ f(d). We can conclude that the optimal
strategy is to observe the first d∗ secretaries without hiring any and to choose the first suitable secretary
thereafter. It is easy to see (similarly to [Bru00]), that randomization cannot lead to a better stopping
rule.
From Lemma 3.1, we can conclude that there is some function f : n→ [0, n] for which the optimal
algorithm for the returning secretary problem is Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Returning secretary algorithm with function f
Input : n, the number of secretaries
Output: A secretary s
the Candidate = ∅;
for round r = 1 to 2n do
Let ir be the secretary that arrives on round r;
Denote by dr the distinct number of secretaries that have arrived up to round r;
if ir is the Candidate then
if dr > f(n) then
Return ir;
if ir is better than the Candidate then
the Candidate = ir;
We do not, at this time, attempt to find the function f for which Algorithm 1 is optimized; we will
optimize the parameter of a similar algorithm for a slightly different setting in Subsection 3.3. For now,
we focus on the special case where f(n) ≡ 0, which we call the no waiting case. Aside from being
interesting in their own right, these results will come in useful later on, for tightly bounding the success
probability.
3.2 The No Waiting Case
In the classical secretary problem, even if we don’t know n in advance, we can still find the best secretary
with a reasonable probability, assuming we have some other information regarding the secretaries. For
example, the secretaries can have an known arrival time density over [0, 1] [Bru84]8; n can be selected
from some known distribution [PS82]; there are other, similar scenarios (see e.g., [Ste81, AHBT82,
Por87]). However, with no advance knowledge at all, it is impossible to attain a success probability
better than 1/n (with a deterministic algorithm): if we don’t accept the first item, we run the risk of
there being no other items, while if we do accept it, we have accepted the best secretary with probability
1/n. It is easy to see that while randomization may help a little, is cannot lead to a constant success
probability. In the returning-online scenario, though, we have the following result.
8Note that this is different from the alternative formulation described in the introduction as in this case n is unknown.
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Theorem 3.2. In the returning secretary problem, even if we have no previous information on the secre-
taries, including the number of secretaries that will arrive, we can hire the best secretary with probability
at least 2/3.
Denote by win the event that we hire the best secretary. Theorem 3.2 is immediate from the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.3. When applying Algorithm 1 to the returning secretary problem with f(n) ≡ 0,
Pr[win] =
2n+ 1
3n
.
Proof. Let us call the best secretary Don. If we reach round i and see Don, we say we win on round i,
and denote this event wini. (Notice that we can say that we win at this point even though this is the first
time we see Don, as we will certainly hire him). The probability of winning on round 1 is exactly the
probability that Don arrives first:
Pr[win1] =
2
2n
.
We win on round 2 if any secretary other than Don arrived on round 1, and Don arrived on round 2.
Pr[win2] =
(
2n− 2
2n
)(
2
2n− 1
)
.
The probability of winning on round i > 2 is the following (the best secretary we had seen until that
point did not return between rounds 2 and i− 1, and Don arrived on round i):
Pr[wini] =
(
2n − 2
2n
)(
2n− 4
2n− 1
)(
2n − 5
2n − 2
)(
2n− 6
2n− 3
)
. . .
(
2n− i− 1
2n− i+ 2
)(
2
2n− i+ 1
)
.
Therefore
Pr[win] =
1
n
+
1
n(2n− 1)(2n − 3)
2n−2∑
i=2
(2n − i)(2n − i− 1)
=
1
n
+
2(n− 1)(2n − 1)(2n − 3)
3n(2n − 1)(2n − 3) (2)
=
3
3n
+
2(n − 1)
3n
=
2n+ 1
3n
,
where (2) is reached by substituting j = 2n− i and simplifying the sum.
3.3 Optimizing the Success Probability
We would now like to optimize f in Algorithm 1 in order to maximize the algorithm’s success probabil-
ity. For ease of analysis, we turn to the alternative model for the secretary problem: instead of generating
a random permutation over the secretaries, each secretary i is allocated, uniformly and independently
at random, two real numbers r1i , r2i ∈ [0, 1), representing his two arrival times, i1 and i2. Assume
that f∗ is the optimal function for Algorithm 1. Fix n and let µ denote the time of the arrival of the
(f∗(n))th distinct secretary. It is easy to see that the two models are asymptotically identical: for large
n, Pr[ij is one of the first f∗(n) arrivals] ≅ Pr[ij ∈ [0, µ)]. The analysis in this model is much cleaner,
and so, for simplicity, (and at the expense of accuracy for small n), we use it to obtain our bounds. The
optimal algorithm for the returning secretary problem in this model is Algorithm 2.
We introduce some new notation.
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• Denote by win(µ) the event that we hire the best secretary when using Algorithm 2 with parameter
µ.
• Let αi(µ) be the event that r1i , r2i ∈ [0, µ).
• Let βi(µ) be the event that r1i ∈ [0, µ) and r2i ∈ [µ, 1) or vice versa.
• Let γi(µ) be the event that r1i , r2i ∈ [µ, 1).
We omit (µ) from the notation when it is clear from context. Label the best secretary by 1, the second
best by 2 and so on. Denote by win(NWi) the event that we find the best secretary in the no waiting
scenario with i secretaries (recall that this is 2i+13i ). We make the following observations, which depend
on the arrival times being independent.
Algorithm 2: Returning secretary algorithm with parameter µ ∈ [0, 1)
Output: A secretary s
the Candidate = ∅;
Observe the first secretary;
while there are secretaries that have not arrived do
Let i be the observed secretary;
Let ti be the time that i is observed;
if i is the Candidate then
if time ≥ µ then
Return i;
if i is better than the Candidate then
the Candidate = i;
Observe the next secretary;
Observation 3.4. ∀i ∈ [n],Pr[αi(µ)] = µ2,Pr[βi(µ)] = 2µ(1− µ),Pr[γi(µ)] = (1− µ)2.
Observation 3.5. Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi, αi+1] = Pr[win(NWi)].
Proof. If γ1, γ2, . . . , γi hold then all of the appearances of the best i secretaries are in the interval [µ, 1).
Both appearances of the (i+ 1)th best secretary are in [0, µ); therefore we will definitely choose one of
the i best secretaries, and the probability of choosing the best is as in the no waiting scenario.
Observation 3.6. Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi, βi+1] = Pr[win(NWi+1)|secretary i+1 is the first to arrive].
Proof. If γ1, γ2, . . . , γi and βi+1 hold then all appearances of the best i secretaries are in the interval
[µ, 1), and the (i + 1)th secretary arrived once by time µ. This reduces to the problem of choosing the
best secretary in the no waiting scenario, given that the (i+ 1)th secretary arrives first.
Claim 3.7. Pr[win(NWi+1)|secretary i+ 1 is the first to arrive] = 2i2i+1 Pr[win(NWi)].
Proof. Given that i + 1 is the first to arrive, if i + 1 arrives second, we lost. If not, i + 1 cannot be
chosen anymore, and we are exactly in the no waiting scenario with i secretaries. The probability that
i+ 1 arrives second given that he also arrives first is 12i+1 .
Combining Observation 3.6 and Claim 3.7 gives the following corollary.
Corollary 3.8. Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi, βi+1] = 2i2i+1 Pr[win(NWi)].
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We are now able to obtain a recursive representation of Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi].
Claim 3.9. Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi] = µ2+4µi−2µ2i3i + (1− µ)2 Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi+1].
Proof.
Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi] =Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi, αi+1] Pr[αi+1]
+ Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi, βi+1] Pr[βi+1]
+ Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi, γi+1] Pr[γi+1]
=µ2 Pr[win(NWi)] +
4µi(1− µ)
2i+ 1
Pr[win(NWi)] (3)
+ (1− µ)2 Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi+1]
=
µ2 + 4µi− 2µ2i
2i+ 1
Pr[win(NWi)] + (1− µ)2 Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi+1],
=
µ2 + 4µi− 2µ2i
3i
+ (1− µ)2 Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi+1], (4)
where (3) is due to Observations 3.4, and 3.5 and Corollary 3.8, and (4) is due to Lemma 3.3.
Claim 3.10. For any constant k, and any µ ∈ [0, 1),
Pr[win] ≥ 2µ(1− µ) +
k∑
i=1
(
(1− µ)2i(µ2 + 4µi− 2µ2i)
3i
)
+
2
3
(1− µ)2k+1. (5)
Proof.
Pr[win] =Pr[win |α1] · Pr[α1] + Pr[win |β1] · Pr[β1] + Pr[win |γ1] · Pr[γ1]
=0 · (µ2) + 1 · 2µ(1 − µ) + Pr[win |γ1] · (1− µ)2, (6)
where (6) is due to Observation 3.4.
Recursively applying Claim 3.9, and noticing that Pr[win |γ1, γ2, . . . , γi] ≥ 23 , for all i, completes
the claim.
Lemma 3.11. For any x ∈ [0, 1), Pr[win] ≥ 2x− 43x2 − 13(1− x)2 log(1− x2).
Proof. Substituting x = 1− µ in (5), and ignoring the lowest order term, we get
Pr[win] ≥ 2x(1− x) + 1
3
k∑
i=1
x2i
(
(1− x)2 + 4(1− x)i− 2(1− x)2i
i
)
= 2x(1− x) + 1
3
(1− x)2
k∑
i=1
x2i
i
+
1
3
k∑
i=1
x2i(4− 4x)− 2(1− x)2)
= 2x(1− x) + 1
3
(1− x)2
k∑
i=1
x2i
i
+
1
3
k∑
i=1
x2i(2− 2x2)
= 2x(1− x) + 1
3
(1− x)2
k∑
i=1
x2i
i
+
1
3
(
k∑
i=1
2x2i −
k∑
i=1
2x2(i+1)
)
≥ 2x(1− x) + 1
3
(1− x)2
k∑
i=1
x2i
i
+
2
3
x2 (7)
−→
k→∞
2x− 4
3
x2 − 1
3
(1− x)2 log(1− x2), (8)
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where in (7), we once again ignore the lowest order term, and (8) is because
∞∑
i=1
yi
i
is the Taylor series
for − log(1− y), for |y| < 1.
Differentiating (8), we find that the winning probability is maximized at x =
√
e5−eW (2e
5)
e5/2
≈
0.727374, where W (z) is the product log function. This implies µ ≈ 0.272626, and for this value,
Pr[win] ≈ 0.767974. This gives our main result of the section.
Theorem 3.12. The optimal algorithm for the returning secretary problem, for n→∞, is Algorithm 2
with µ = 0.272626; the probability of hiring the best secretary is at least 0.76797.
It is interesting to note that µ = 0.272626 implies that f(n) −→
n→∞
0.4709n (as the expected number
of secretaries that arrive in [0, x) is x2 + 2x(1 − x)), meaning that in the optimal strategy, we should
wait until we have seen almost half of the secretaries before considering hiring.
4 The Returning Matroid Secretary
We show that in the returning online model, when k = 2, a simple algorithm obtains a 2-approximation
to the maximum-weight basis of the matroid. It is a well known property of matroids (e.g., [Rad57]), that
the Greedy algorithm always finds a maximum-weight basis. Algorithm 3, in essence, lets n elements
arrive, and then runs the Greedy algorithm on the elements which have only arrived once.
Algorithm 3: Returning matroid secretary algorithm
Input : a cardinality n = |E| of the matroid M = (E,I)
Output: an independent set S ∈ I
Let n elements arrive, without choosing any element;
Let E′ denote the elements which only arrived once thus far;
Relabel the elements of E′ by 1, 2, . . . , |E′|, such that w1 ≥ w2 ≥ · · · ≥ w|E′|;
S ← ∅;
for i = 1 to |E′| do
if S ∪ i ∈ I then
S ← S ∪ i;
Return S;
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 3 is 2-competitive in expectation.
To prove Theorem 4.1, we need Claims 4.2 and 4.3. Let Xe be a random variable which is 1 iff e
appears in E′.
Claim 4.2. For any e ∈ E,
Pr[Xe = 1] =
n
2n − 1 .
Proof. Let S denote the set of the first n elements to arrive and T denote the set of the last n elements.
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For element e, denote its two arrivals by e1 and e2. e ∈ E′ iff e1 ∈ S and e2 ∈ T or vice versa.
Pr[e1 ∈ S] = 1
2
,
Pr[e2 ∈ T |e1 ∈ S] = n
2n − 1 ,
P r[e1 ∈ S ∧ e2 ∈ T ] = Pr[e1 ∈ S] Pr[e2 ∈ T |e1 ∈ S] = n
4n− 2 .
By symmetry, Pr[e1 ∈ T ∧ e2 ∈ S] = n4n−2 , and by summation (as these events are disjoint), the claim
follows.
Let B∗ be a maximum-weight basis of M, and GREEDY(E′) be the output of the Greedy algorithm
on the set E′ ⊆ E. Denote the restriction of B∗ to E′ by B∗|E′. That is, B∗|E′ is the elements of E′
which appear in B∗.
Claim 4.3. Let GREEDY(E′) = {e1, e2, . . . , eℓ} and B∗|E′ = {f1, f2, . . . , fk}, where GREEDY(E′)
and B∗|E′ are sorted by weights in a non-increasing order. That is w(e1) ≥ w(e2) ≥ . . . ≥ w(eℓ), and
w(f1) ≥ w(f2) ≥ . . . ≥ w(fk). Then for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, ei ≥ fi.
Proof. First, notice that by the hereditary property, B∗|E ∈ I . Because the Greedy algorithm neces-
sarily finds an independent set, by the exchange property, it must hold that ℓ ≥ k. Now assume by
contradiction that there exists some i for which fi > ei. Let j be the first index for which this inequality
holds. It holds that
ej−1 ≥ fj−1 ≥ fj > ej .
Consider the subsets X = {f1, f2, . . . , fj} and Y = {e1, e2, . . . , ej−1}. By the exchange property, one
of the elements of X can be added to Y while maintaining the independence property. But the Greedy
algorithm chose ej , which is lighter than all of the elements of X, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Denote the expected weight of the set returned by Algorithm 3 by W .
W =
∑
E′⊂E
w(GREEDY(E′)) Pr[E′]
≥
∑
E′⊂E
w(B|E′) Pr[E′] (9)
=
∑
E′⊆E
∑
e∈B
w(e) Pr[e ∈ E′]
=
∑
e∈B
w(e)
∑
E′⊆E
Pr[e ∈ E′]
=
∑
e∈B
w(e) Pr[Xe = 1]
=
n
2n − 1w(B
∗), (10)
where (9) and 10 are due to Claims 4.3 and 4.2 respectively.
Algorithm 3 lets n elements arrive, and runs the Greedy algorithm. In expectation, though, only 3/4
of the elements have already arrived. Therefore, there are roughly 1/4 of the elements which the algo-
rithm doesn’t even make an attempt to add to the set. Clearly, if it continued to add elements in a Greedy
fashion, this could only improve the competitive ratio. However, we show that this will not be much help
in the general case. We use the example given by Babaioff et al., [BIK07]: There is a graphic matroid
G = (V,E), where V = {u, v, w1, w2, . . . , wm} and E = (u, v) ∪ {(u,wi), (v,wi)|i = 1, 2, . . . ,m}.
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The weights are assigned to the edges as follows: w(u, v) = m + 1, w(u,wi) ∈ (ǫ, 2ǫ), w(v,wi) ∈
(2ǫ, 3ǫ), for some small constant ǫ > 0. If e∗ was not added to the forest in the Greedy phase just after
the first n rounds, the probability it will be added is exponentially small in m, as w.h.p. there is a pair of
edges (u,wj), (v,wj) that has been added to the forest. If e∗ is not added to the forest, the competitive
ratio is at most 13ǫ , and so continuing to use Greedy after n elements have passed will not significantly
improve the competitive ratio.
In the case of transversal matroids though, we can use local improvements to improve the competi-
tive ratio to 16/9.
5 Returning bipartite edge-weighted matching
The returning bipartite edge-weighted matching problem is a generalization of the returning transversal
matroid problem.9 Let G = (L ∪ R,E) be a bipartite graph with a weight function w : E → R+. We
are initially given R and n = |L|. In each step, a vertex v ∈ L arrives together with its edges (and the
edges’ weights). Each vertex arrives twice, and the order of arrival is selected uniformly at random from
the (2n)! possible arrival orders. When a vertex ℓ ∈ L arrives for the second time, it is either matched
to one of the free vertices in R that are adjacent to ℓ, or left unmatched. The goal of the algorithm
is to maximize the weight of the matching. Note that if |R| = 1, and we succeed only if we find the
maximum matching, this is exactly the returning secretary problem.
We present a variation on the returning matroid secretary algorithm, where instead of the Greedy
algorithm, we use a maximum-matching algorithm (using any maximum matching algorithm, e.g., the
Hungarian method [Kuh55]). We then use local improvements, similarly to [KRTV13].
Algorithm 4: Returning bipartite edge-weighted matching algorithm
Input : vertex set R and a cardinality n = |L|
Output: a matching M
Let Lr be the vertices that arrived until round r.;
Let L′ ⊂ Ln denote the vertices that only arrived once until round n;
M = optimal matching on G[L′ ∪R];
for each subsequent round t > n, when vertex ℓt ∈ L arrives do
Mt = optimal matching on G[Lt ∪R];
Let et be the edge assigned to ℓt in Mt;
if M ∪ et is a matching then
M = M ∪ et;
Return M ;
Our main result for this section is the following.
Theorem 5.1. Algorithm 4 is 16/9-competitive.
Let st denote the number of elements which have arrived exactly once by round t. We would like to
show that sn is concentrated around it mean.
We require The Azuma-Hoeffding inequality (see e.g., [CL06]):
9A transversal matroid is a bipartite graph G = (L∪R,E) where the elements are the vertices ofL and the independent sets
are sets of endpoints of matchings in the graph. Transversal matroids are a special case of bipartite edge-weighted matching,
in which all the edges incident on the same vertex ℓ ∈ L have the same weight.
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Theorem 5.2 (Azuma-Hoeffding). Let Zi, i = 0, 1, . . . , n be a martingale such that for each i, |Zi −
Zi−1| < c. Then, for any λ > 0
Pr[|Zn − Z0| > λ] ≤ 2e−
λ2
2nc2 .
We note that computing more precise values for the approximation bounds in Claims 5.3, 5.5 and
5.6 is straightforward; for clarity and simplicity we use little-o notation. We use “with high probability”
to denote “with probability at least 1− 1
nα
”, for α > 1.
Claim 5.3. With high probability, sn = n2 ± o(n).
Proof. Let Yi be a random variable whose value is 1 if the vertex arriving on round i is arriving for the
first time and (−1) otherwise. Denote, for every j ∈ {0, 1, . . . n}, Zj = E[sn|Y1, Y2, . . . , Yj ]. Zj is
the expected number of elements that will have arrived exactly once by round n given Y1, . . . , Yj . Z0 is
the expected value of sn. From Claim 4.2 and the linearity of expectation Z0 = n
2
2n−1 . sn satisfies the
Lipschitz condition: Let yj be the realization of Yj , for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, then
(sn|y1, . . . , yi−1, 1, yi+1, . . . , yn)− (sn|y1, . . . , yi−1,−1, yi+1, . . . , yn) = 2.
Therefore for all i, |Zi − Zi−1| ≤ 2, and we can therefore apply the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality:
Pr[|Z0 − Zn| > c
√
n] ≤ e−c
2
8 .
The claim follows.
Claim 5.3 shows that the size of the matching M in Algorithm 4 at round n is approximately n/2.
W.h.p. the number of vertices that have not yet arrived is approximately n/4, as for any vertex i, the
probability that neither of its arrivals is in the first half is 1/4 ± o(1). Therefore we have the following
corollary to Claim 5.3 :
Corollary 5.4. With high probability, the size of the matching M at round 2n is at most 3n4 + o(n).
We need a few more simple claims before we can prove Theorem 5.1. Recall that et is the edge
matched to vertex ℓt on round t. Denote by OPT the weight of the maximum weight matching.
Claim 5.5. For all t, such that a new vertex arrives at time t,
E[w(et)] ≥ OPT
n
.
Proof. In round t, we can view ℓt as being selected uniformly at random from Lt, and so the expected
weight of et in Mt is w(Mt)|Lt| . We can view Lt as being a set of size |Lt| selected uniformly at random
from L, therefore E[w(Mt)] ≥ OPT · |Lt|n . Combining the two inequalities gives the claim.
Claim 5.6. For t > n ,
Pr[M ∪ et is a matching] ≥ 1/4− o(1).
Proof. The edge et = (ℓt, r) can be added to M only if r is unmatched in M . From Corollary 5.4, we
know that w.h.p. the size of the matching M at round n is at most 3n4 + o(n). Therefore, on any round,
at least n/4 − o(n) vertices of R must be unmatched. As r can be seen as being selected uniformly at
random from Mt, the claim follows.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows from Corollary 5.4 and Claims 5.5 and 5.6:
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We have that for all t ≥ n, Pr[M ∪ et is a matching] ≥ 1/4 − o(1). There are
at least n/4 − o(n) vertices that have not yet arrived by round n. As each of them has a probability of
at east 1/4 − o(1) to be matched, by a union bound, between rounds n and 2n, we add to M edges that
weigh a total of OPT16 − o(n) in expectation.
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A The Twice-Returning Secretary (the No Waiting Case)
We give a succinct description the algorithm of Section 3 with f(n) = 0, adapted to the 2-returning
secretary problem: as the secretaries arrive, we keep note of the best secretary we have seen so far,
without hiring any. Once the secretary we have marked as the best so far returns for the second time, we
hire him.
Lemma A.1. There is an algorithm that hires the best secretary with probability 0.9, in the 2-returning
secretary, even without previous knowledge of n.
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Proof. As before, if we reach round i and see Don, we say we win on round i, and denote this event
wini. The probability of winning on rounds 1− 3 is easy to compute directly:
Pr[win1] =
3
3n
,
Pr[win2] =
(
3n− 3
3n
)(
3
3n − 1
)
,
P r[win3] =
(
3n− 3
3n
)(
3n − 4
3n − 1
)(
3
3n− 2
)
.
However, from the fourth round on, we need to verify the best secretary so far has not yet appeared three
times. This is similar to case of a single return, except that we win in round i if we see Don and the best
secretary so far has appeared either once or twice. These are mutually exclusive events. When analyzing
the secretaries that arrived until round i− 1, we do the following: we find the best secretary so far. If he
has appeared twice, we break the tie uniformly at random, choosing one of the copies to be the best. The
best secretary so far appeared in some round, j. For simplicity, we relabel round j by 1 and the rounds
1, 2, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . , i− 1 by 2, 3, . . . , i− 1.
Pr[wini] =
(
3n− 3
3n
)(
3n− 6
3n− 1
)(
3n− 7
3n− 2
)
. . .
(
3n − i− 3
3n − i+ 2
)(
3
3n − i+ 1
)
+
(
3n− 3
3n
) i−1∑
j=2
(
2
3n− 1
)(
3n− 6
3n− 2
)(
3n− 7
3n− 3
)
. . .
(
3n − i− 2
3n − i+ 2
)(
3
3n − i+ 1
)
.
The first line is the probability of winning if the best secretary only appeared once, the second is if the
best secretary appeared twice already, where the sum is over all the possible locations of the repeating
secretary. This simplifies to
Pr[win] =
3
3n
+
(
3n − 3
3n
)(
3
3n− 1
)
+
(
3n − 3
3n
)(
3n− 4
3n− 1
)(
3
3n − 2
)
+
3n−3∑
i=4
(3n− i)(3n − i− 1)(3n − i− 2)(3n + i− 9)
n(3n− 1)(3n − 2)(3n − 4)(3n − 5) .
It is easy to verify that Pr[win]→ 0.9 as n→∞.
Using the methods of this section, it is easy (although cumbersome) to compute the exact probability
of Pr[win] for the algorithm above adapted to any k. In the following section, we show that if k =
Θ(log n), we can hire the best secretary with arbitrarily high probability.
B The Θ(logn)-returning secretary
In this section, we show that in the k-returning secretary problem, if k = Θ(log n), we can guarantee an
arbitrarily high probability of success, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem B.1. For every α ∈ R+, there exists a constant c > 0, such that in the c log n-returning
secretary problem,
Pr[win] ≥ 1− 1
nα
.
Proof. Assume each secretary returns k = c log n times, for c > 0 to be determined later. Denote by
tia ∈ {1, 2, . . . , kn} the time of secretary a’s ith arrival. Let Xa,b be a random variable whose value is 1
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if ∀i, jtia < tjb and 0 otherwise. That is, Xa,b = 1 iff all of the k appearances of secretary a occur before
all of the k appearances of secretary b. We show that for any two secretaries, a and b,
Pr[Xa,b = 1] ≤ 1/nα.
Take an arbitrary ordering on the n−2 secretaries that are not a or b and fix the 2k possible positions
of a and b relative to this ordering. There are (2k)! possibilities for the appearances of the two secretaries.
As the probability of Xa,b is independent of this ordering,
Pr[Xa,b] =
((c log n)!)2
(2c log n)!
=
(
2c log n
c log n
)−1
≤ 2−c logn.
Denote the best secretary by s. Taking a union bound over Pr[Xi,s], i 6= s, and choosing an appro-
priate value for c, completes the proof.
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